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RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 
AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE SYNDROME 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard IN. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
!n recent years, prosecutors have attempted to 
introduce expert testimony concerning rape trauma 
syndrome in rape prosecutions. Similarly, they have 
offered evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome in child abuse cases. The use of both 
syndromes has been controversial. This article discusses 
the legal and scientific bases for this use of social 
science research. 
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 
The phrase rape trauma syndrome (RTS) was coined 
by Burgess and Holmstrom to describe the behavioral, 
somatic, and psychological reactions of rape and 
attempted rape victims. Burgess & Holmstrom, "Rape 
Trauma Syndrome," 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 981 (1974). See 
~~· also Burgess, "Rape Trauma Syndrome," 1 Behav. Sci. 
~~ & Law 97 (Summer 1983). Based on interviews with 146 
"' women, they found that victims usually progress through 
Dear colleagues, 
It is with mixed emotions, a touch of sadness and a tinge of 
relief, that I write this last chapter of my tenure as Cuyahoga 
County Public Defender. But, alas, it seems as if it is time to 
do so. 
On May 19, 1977, I was tmnsformed from the role of 26 
years as a prosectutor and selected to be the first Chief Public 
Defender of Cuyahoga County. (A true metamorphosis!). 
Since that date with one employee (myself) and 6000 square 
feet in the newly constructed Justice Center, we grew to 83 I , employees and 16,000 square feet in a beautifully renovated ! West Third, 100 Lakeside Place. Our offices are comprised of 
; Felony, Juvenile, and Appellate Divisions with supporting 
' i; staff of social workers, investigators, secretaries, and law 
clerks which handle approximately 10,000 cases per year. 
The development of the Public Defender Office would not 
a two-phase process - an acute phase and a long-term 
reorganization phase. Impact reactions in the acute 
phase involve either an "expressed style" in which fear, 
anger and anxiety are manifested, or a "controlled style" 
in which these feelings are masked by a composed or 
subdued behavior. Somatic reactions include physical 
trauma, skeletal muscle tension, gastrointestinal irritabili-
ty, and genitourinary disturbance. In addition, a wide 
gamut of emotional reactions, ranging from fear, humilia-
tion, and embarrassment to anger, revenge, and self-
blame are exhibited. 
The second phase, the reorganization phase, typically 
begins two to six weeks after the attack and is a period in 
which the victim attempts to re-establish her life. This 
period is characterized by activity, such as changing 
residences, changing telephone numbers, or visiting 
family members. Nightmares and dreams are common. 
Rape-related phobias, such as fear of being alone or fear 
happened without the support of the County Commissioners, 
Public Defender Commissioners, Judges, County Adminis-
trators, Office of Budget Management, State Public 
Defenders, Professor Paul Gianelli and the Defender 
Reporter, The Legal Aid Society, and many others. 
I'll be retiring by August 1993, and my greatest thanks 
goes to my staff, past and present, for making this office 
what it is today. The greatest pride I have is watching young 
lawyers develop into accomplished litigators. 
So thanks to all of you for what we all have accomplished. 
By Friedman 
P.S. I collect antique music boxes and mechanical banks which should keep me busy! 
r Public Defender Hyman Friedman Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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of having people behind one, and difficulties in sexual 
relationships also are prominent. · 
Other studies elaborated on the initial research, some-
times confirming the earlier studies and sometimes 
providing additional insights. "Subsequent research, 
which is much more rigorous, conceptualizes rape 
trauma in terms of specific symptoms rather than more 
general stages of recovery." Frazier & Borg ida, "Rape 
Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and Psycho-
logical Research," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 293, 299 (1992). 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder· 
RTS is now recognized as a type of post-traumatic 
stress disorder {PTSD), and such disorders are included 
in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association's diagnostic manual. A.P.A. Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual ofMental Disorder 247 {3d ed. rev. 
1987) ("Post-traumatic Stress Disorder"). This approach 
to RTS, however, does not focus on the two-stage model 
of recov~ry posited by Burgess and Holmstrom but rather 
on specific symptoms. 
Criticism 
Critic:s have questioned the scientific basis for RTS 
evidence. After surveying the literature {1984), one 
commentator concluded that "definitional problems, 
biased research samples, and the inherent complexity of 
the phenomenon vitiate all attempts to establish empiri-
cally the causal relationship implicit in the concept of a 
rape trauma syndrome." Note, "Checking the Allure of 
Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal 
Proceedings;'L70Va .. l::Rev. 1657, 1678(1984). Some of 
the research problems included (1) unrepresentative 
samples, {2) the failure to distinguishbetween victims of 
rapes, attempted rapes, and molestation, and {3) the 
failure to account for individual idiosyncratic and 
incident-specific reactions. /d. at 1678-80. In 1989 a 
psychologist concluded that "research on the rape trauma 
syndrome is not probative on prior consent, prior trauma, 
nor the cause of the complainant's current behavior." 
Graham, "Rape Trauma Syndrome: Is It Probative of 
Lack of Consent?," 13 Law & Psych. Rev. 25, 41-42 (1989). 
A 1992 review of ttie literature by Frazier and Borg ida 
included a number of findings: Although victims 
experience arCiiJQe ofsymptonis, only a few symptoms 
have. been studied consistently- fee1r and anxiety, 
depression~ soc.iai maladjustmemt, and sexual dysfunc-
tion. Recent studies also document symptoms identified 
for PTSD-'- recurrent nightmares, irritability, and hyper-
vigilance. Frazier & Borgida, "Rape Trauma Syndrome: A 
Review of the Case Law and Psychological Research," 
16 Law & Hum. Behav. 293, 300 {1992). They concluded: 
In our opinion, although early studies were plagued 
by numerous methodological problems ... , several 
studies have since been conducted that are much 
more sophisticated methodologically ... These 
studies have assessed victim recovery at several 
points after the assault using standardized assess-
ment measures and have employed carefully matched 
control groups. This research has established that 
rape victims experience more depression, anxiety, 
fear, and social adjustment and sexual problems than 
2 
women who have not l::leen victimized. Research on 
PTSD among rape victims is more recent but consis-
tently suggests that many victims experience PTSD 
symptoms following an assault. Initially high symptom 
levels generally abate by 3 to 4 months postassault, 
although significant levels of distress continue for 
many victims. /d. at 301. 
The focus of much of the research was to understand 
the victim's reactions in order to provide assistance to the 
victim. The focus was not to evaluate a victim's reactions 
in order to establish the fact that a rape had occurred, 
which is how RTS evidence is sometimes used at trial. 
There is an accepted body of research concerning the 
aftereffects of rape. The critical issue, however, is how 
the research is used in court. 
Frazier and Borgida also reviewed expert testimony in 
the reported cases. In several instances they found 
·testimony that was unsupported by research. For example, 
in Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 {Wyo. 1986), the 
expert testified that it is "very common" for a victim to 
ask an assailant not to tell anyone about the assault. 
Frazier and Borgida concluded that "this particular 
behavior has not been documented in the research 
literature." Frazier & Borgida, supra at 304. Their con-
clusions concerning court testimony are noteworthy: 
In sum, experts in recent cases have described a 
broad range of symptoms and behaviors as consistent 
with RTS, some of which do not appear to be based on 
research. Testimony that is not research based often 
seems to be prompted by a defendant's claims that a 
complainant's behavior was inconsistent with having 
been raped. If virtually any victim behavior is 
described as consistent with RTS, the term soon will 
have little meaning. Indeed, some critics have argued 
that this already is the case ... /d. at 304-05. 
JURY STUDIES 
Social scientists have also attempted to determine 
whether the typical jury is generally knowledgeable 
about the aftereffects of rape, and what the impact of 
expert testimony on this subject will have on a jury. ·1n 
1988 Frazier and Borgida administered an 18-item ques-
tionnaire on sexual assault to two professional groups: 
rape experts and PTSD,experts. Frazier & Borgida, "Juror 
Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape 
Trauma $yndrqme Evidence in Court;'' 12 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 101 {1988). The responses of the experts were 
then compared to those of two nonexpert groups 
{students and nonacademic university staff). 
Significantly, the non experts were unaware of the 
behavioral changes a victim often experiences following 
a rape./d. at 114. The nonexpert groups scored markedly 
lower on the questionnaire than did the experts- near 
chance levels {57% and 58% correct)./d. at 112. This 
study suggests that jurors often need to be informed 
about this subject in order to understand the evidence. 
Other studies by Brekke and Boriga focus on the 
impact RTS testimony has on jurors. These experiments 
suggest that RTS testimony has a greater impact when 
introduced early in trial rather than later. "Expert testimony, 
when presented early in the trial, may serve as a powerful 
organizing theme or basis for a juror's initial impression 
of the case. When presented later in the trial, by contrast, 
the expert testimony may be treated merely as additional 
information to be integrated into an existing, well-
organized impression." Brekke & Borgida, "Expert 
Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social-Cognitive 
Analysis," 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psycho. 372, 383 
(1988). See also Borgida & Brekke, "Psycholegal 
Research on Rape Trials," in Rape and Sexual Assault: 
A Research Handbook 313 (A. Burgess ed. 1985}. 
A second finding was that expert testimony had a 
greater impact if it was "concretized" through the use of 
a case-specific hypothetical question. The more general 
testimony consisted of an attempt to debunk many of the 
common myths about rape. The expert in the experi-
ments testified that (a} few women falsely accuse men of 
rape, (b) rape is a highly underreported crime, (c) a large 
proportion of rapes involve casual acquaintance of the 
victim rather than strangers, (d) rape is a crime of . 
violence rather than a crime of passion, and (e) it is often 
better for a woman to submit than to risk the additional 
violence that could result from ineffective resistance. 
When this testimony was followed by a hypothetical 
question incorporating the important features of the 
case, it had a greater impact. /d. 
The studies also indicated that jurors did not automati-
cally accept the expert's testimony, and that expert 
testimony was important in acquaintance rape and lack 
of physical resistance situations. 
ADMISSIBILITY: lACK OF CONSENT 
RTS evidence may be offered at trial for several differ-
ent purposes: (1} to prove lack of consent by the alleged 
victim, and (2) to explain post-incident conduct by a 
victim that a jury might perceive as inconsistent with the 
claim of rape. The courts divide over the first use but 
generally accept the second use. · 
A number of courts permit RTS evidence to be 
introduced at trial to establish lack of consent, an 
element of the crime of rape. The inference may be stat-
ed as a syllogism: (1} Rape victims manifest certain 
characteristics kriown as RTS; (2} the alleged victim has 
these symptoms; and (3} therefore she has been raped. 
In 1982 in State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 
[1982), thE;! Kansas Supreme Court became.the first state 
supreme court to uphold the admission of RTS evidence. 
1\ psychiatrist, who examined the victim twoweeks after 
:he attack, testified that the victim had suffered a "fright-
:ming assault" and was "suffering from the post-traumatic 
>tress disorder known as rape trauma syndrome." /d. at 
354, 647 P.2d at 1299. The Court concluded: 
An examination of the literature clearly demon-
strates that the so-called "rape trauma syndrome" is 
generally accepted to be a common reaction to sexual 
assault ... As such, qualified expert psychiatric 
testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma 
syndrome is relevant and admissible in a case such as 
this where the defense is consent. /d. 
Other courts followed this precedent. E.g., State v. 
iuey, 145 Ariz. 59, 64, 699 P.2d 1290, 1295 (1985}; State 
'· Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 1989}; State v. 
llcQuillen, 239 Kan. 590, 593, 721 P.2d 740, 741-42 
1986}; State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 171, 689 P.2d 
122, 829 (1984); State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109,517 
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A.2d 741, 751 (1986); State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 
186-89, 685 P.2d 918, 922-23 (1984); State v. Whitman, 16 
Ohio App. 3d 246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984). 
In addition, Illinois has enacted a statute that permits 
the admission of evidence of post-traumatic stress 
syndrome in illegal sex acts prosecutions. Ill. Ann. Stat. 
ch. 38, § 115-7.2 (Smith-Hurd 1990). 
limitations on Admissibility 
Different courts have imposed a variety of limitations 
on this use of RTS evidence. Some courts permit the 
expert to testify that the victim's behavior was consistent 
with RTS but not that the victim had been raped. State v. 
McCoy, 179 W.Va. 223,229-30,366 S.E.2d 731, 737 (W. 
Va. 1988). 
Other courts prohibit: 
(1) comment on the credibility of the alleged victim, 
State v. Brodniak, 221 Mont. 212, 217-18, 718 P.2d 322, 
326-29 (1986) (RTS evidence admissible but expert 
may not comment on victim's credibility); 
(2) use of the term "rape trauma syndrome," State v. 
Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109,517 A.2d 741,751 (1986) 
(Avoiding the term RTS is "more than cosmetic"); 
(3) any reference to the accused, State v. Huang, 99 
N.C. App. 658,665-66,394 S.E.2d 279,284 (1990) (RTS 
evidence admissible, but expert's repeated implication 
of defendant was prejudicial error), rev. denied, 327 
N.C. 639, 399 S.E.2d 127 (1990). 
Courts Rejecting Admissibility 
Courts rejecting RTS as proof of lack of consent 
dispute the scientific validity of the syndrome when 
offered for this purpose. In State v. Saldana, 324 N .W. 2d 
127 (1990), the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that 
"(r]ape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test 
that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape 
has occurred." /d. at 229. Accord State v. McGee, 324 
N.W.2d 232,233 (Minn. 1982)'. 
Other courts exclude RTS evidence because it has not 
been generally accepted by the scientific community as 
required by the Frye test. See generally Giannelli, "The 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later," 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980). 
For example, in People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 
P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984}, the California 
Supreme Court noted that "rape trauma syndrome was 
not devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a 
particular past event- i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the 
legal sense occurred - but rather was developed by 
professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to 
help identify, predict and treat emotional problems 
experienced by the counselors' clients or patients." /d. 
at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Thus, 
according to the court, although generally accepted by 
the scientific community for a therapeutic purpose, 
expert testimony on RTS was not generally accepted "to 
prove that a rape, in fact, occurred." /d. at 251, 681 P.2d at 
301,203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The court commented: 
[A]s a rule, rape counselors do not probe inconsisten-
cies in their clients' descriptions of the facts of the inci-
dent, nor do they conduct independent investigations 
to determine whether other evidence corroborates or 
contradicts their clients' renditions. Because their 
function is to help their clients deal with the trauma 
they are experiencing, the historical accuracy of the 
client's descriptions of the details of the traumatizing 
events is not vital in their task. /d. at 250, 681 P.2d at 
300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. 
See also People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 142-44, 768 
P.2d 32, 48-49, 255 Cal. Rptr. 813, 829-30 (1990) (reaffirm-
ing Bledsoe). 
Other courts accept this reasoning. E.g., Spencer v. 
General Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1075~77 (E.D. Va. 
1988); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 
131, 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890 (1990) (RTS "is inadmissi-
ble when itinescapably bears solely on proving that a 
rape occiJrred"); State v. Hall, 330 N.C. 808,821, 412 
S.E.2d 883, 890 (1992); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich. App. 
414, 421-22, 378 N.W.2d 502, 505 {1985) (RTS fails Frye 
test); Statev.Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235,240 (Mo. 1984); 
State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 143-44 (Mo. App.), cert. . 
denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); Statev. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 
336, 346-49, 745 P.2d 12, 15-18 (1987) (RTS fails Frye test). 
ADMISSIBILITY: EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR 
As noted above, the California Supreme Court rejected 
RTS evidence when offered to prove lack of consent. The 
court,' however, approved the admissibility of RTS 
evidence where the defendant suggests to the jury that 
the conduct of the victim after the incident is inconsistent 
with the claim of rape. In this situation, the court wrote, 
"expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome may play a 
particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some 
Widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, 
sotlia:tirntay evaluate the evidence free of popular 
myths." 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. 
Rptr. at 457, 
Most courts accept this position. For example, expert 
testimony has been admitted to explain a victim's: 
(1) passive resistance during a rape, Perez v. State, 
653 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. App. 1983) (in rebuttal, 
expert explained alleged victim's passive resistance 
during rape); 
(2) delay in reporting the crime, United States v. 
Peel, 29 M.J. 235,241 (C. M.A. 1989) (RTS evidence 
admitted to explain postattack behavior-:- delay in 
reporting and attempts to normalize life), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1025 {1990); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 
951-52(Colo.1987) (RTS evidence admissible to 
explain delay in reporting); and 
(3) calm demeanor after an attack, People v. Taylor, 
75 N.Y.2d277, 293,552 N.E.2d 131,138,552 N.Y.S.2d 
883, 890 {1990) ("[H]alf of all women who have been 
forcibly raped are controlled and subdued following 
the attack"); State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 
333-35, 431 N.W.2d 165, 172 (1988) (many victims are 
"emotionally flat" immediately after assault). 
RTS evidence has also been introduced to explain that 
"in the context of a trust relationship, such as a doctor-
patient relationship, some victims may return to the trust-
ed relationship for further contact with the perpetrator of 
the assault." Commonwealth v. Mamay, 407 Mass. 412, 
421, 553 N.E.2d 945, 951 (1990). 
See,a/so United States v. Hammond, 17 M.J. 218 
(C. M.A. 1984) (RTS evidence admitted for sentencing 
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purposes); People v. Mathews, 91 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 
1025, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632 (1979) (RTS admitted to 
support self~defense and diminished capacity claim). 
ADMISSIBILITY: OFFERED BY THE DEFENSE 
In Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989), the 
Indiana Supreme Court held that a defendant may offer 
RTS evidence to show that the victim had not been 
raped. The alleged victim claimed that she had been 
raped at knifepoint after leaving a bar. She returned to 
the same bar the next evening for two hours and a drink. 
The··defendant offered-the testimony of an expert to 
comment on her posfattackconduct. 
The trial court excludedthe evidence, but the Supreme 
Court reversed: "Here, Dr. Gov.er's testimony would have 
tended to prove that J.D.'s behavior after the incident was 
inconsistent with that of a victim who had suffered a trau-
matic rape such as that J.O. recounted. The evidence 
therefore would have a tendency to make it less probable 
that a rape ill fact ()ccurred .. . "/d. at 1,191. See generally 
Note, "Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma 
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim," 42 Hastings 
L.J. 1143 (1991). ' 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME 
Frequently, child sexual abuse cases are difficult to 
prosecute. One commentator summarized the problems 
as follows: 
The sexual offender is often a relative or a trusted 
adult with whom the child spends time alone. Eyewit-
nesses to the molestation are therefore rare. In addi-
tion, sexual abuse is typically a nonviolent crime. 
Children who are abused by a trusted adult usually are 
manipulated psychologically and do not resist their 
abusers. Physical injury cariprovide valuable medical 
evidence of the sexual abuse, but this evidence often 
is lacking because the abuse is committed without 
force. Furthermore, the sexual abuse may involve an 
act other than penetration of the vagina or anus. Crimes 
such as petting, fondling or oral copulation usually do 
not involve forceful physical contact and do not leave 
physical scars. A lapse of time between the sexual 
abuse and disclosure may also contribute to the lack of 
medical evidence. Note, "The Admissibility of 'Child 
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome' in Califor-
nia Crimillal·courts," 17 Pac. L.J. 1361, 1368-69 (1986). 
Incases where there is no independent evidence of 
the abuse, the credibility of the child complainant and the 
defendant often becomes determinative. However, the 
typical responses of child sexual abuse victims are · 
counter-intuitive in many respects. Delayed disclosure, 
conflicting testimony, and retraction suggest fabrication 
by the complainant unless an explanation is offered for 
this anomalous behavior. 
Because of these problems, prosecutors have sought 
other types of evidence to substantiate sex abuse claims. 
Syndrome evidence is an example. Dr. Roland Summit 
coined the phrase "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 
Syndrome" (CSAAS) in 1983 to describe five categories 
of reactions typical of victims of child sexual abuse. 
Summit "The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndro~e,'' 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983). The first 
two categories are preconditions to child sexual abuse; 
the last three are "sequential contingencies" that vary in 
both form and degree. The categories are: 
(1) Secrecy: The child receives the message, either 
explicitly through threats or admonishments or implicitly, 
that the subject is to be kept secret. An aura of danger 
and secrecy surrounds the incidents./d. at 181. 
(2) Helplessness: The imbalance of power that exists 
between child and adult makes the child feel powerless 
to resist. The feeling of helplessness is increased when 
the abuser is a trusted friend or family member. /d. at 
182-83. 
(3) Entrapment and Accommodation: The child who 
does not seek or receive intervention learns to live with 
the sexual abuse in order to survive. In addition to 
submission, other survival mechanisms include turning 
to imaginary friends, developing multiple personalities, 
taking refuge in altered states of consciousness or 
substance abuse, running away, promiscuity, hysterical 
phenomena, delinquency, sociopathy, projection of rage, 
and self-mutilation. /d. at 184-86. 
(4) Delayed, Conflicting and Unconvincing Disclosure: 
Rarely will the child report incidents of sexual abuse 
immediately upon their occurrence. Because of the time 
lapse before report occurs and the emotional upheaval 
experienced by the child, the disclosure is likely to 
contain contradictions and misstatements. Often the 
disclosure is greeted by disbelief. /d. at 186. 
(5) Retraction: "Whatever a child says about sexual 
abuse, she is likely to reverse it." /d. at 188. Particularly if 
the abuser is a family member, the child will attempt to 
undo the disintegration of the family caused by the 
disclosure. /d. 
Dr. Summit developed the syndrome to assist profes-
sionals in treating abused children. The syndrome is not 
a diagnostic tool. "The syndrome does not detect sexual 
abuse. Rather, it assumes the presence of abuse, and 
explains the child's reactions to it. Thus, [CSAAS] is not 
the sexual abuse analogue of battered child syndrome, 
which is diagnostic of physical abuse." Myers, Bays, 
Becker, Berliner, Corwin & Saywitz, "Expert Testimony in 
Child S13xual Abuse Litigation," 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 67 
(1989) [hereinafter cited as Myers]. Consequently, the 
use of the term "syndrome" in court should be avoided. 
Neve~heless, sexually abused children do react to the 
abuse. Anxiety, depression, nightmares, enuresis, 
regression, and acting out are some of the reactions. 
Many of these responses, however, are associated with 
other psychological problems that are unrelated to sex 
abuse. In addition, apparently 20% of abused children 
show no observable reactions. /d. at 64. Some reactions 
are strongly suggestive of abuse: "Examples of behaviors 
that have greater specificity for sexual abuse include 
age-inappropriate knowledge of sexual acts or anatomy, 
sexualization of play and behavior in young children, the 
appearance of genitalia in young children's drawings, 
and sexually explicit play with anatomically detailed 
dolls." /d. at 62-63. 
ADMISSIBILITY 
Expert testimony on child sexual abuse may be offered 
at trial for several distinct purposes: (1) as substantive 
evidence to prove that the child has been abused; (2) to 
explain conduct of the child that a jury might perceive as 
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inconsistent with a claim of abuse; or (3) to bolster or 
impeach the child's credibility. 
In addition to these purposes, the form of the testimo-
ny may vary. For example, expert testimony offered to 
establish abuse could take three different forms: (1) 
general testimony about the behavioral characteristics of 
abused children; (2) testimony that a particular child's 
behavior is consistent with that of abused children; or (3) 
an opinion that a particular child has been abused. 
Characteristics of Abused Children 
Some courts permit expert testimony "regarding the 
behavioral and emotiqnal indicia of child sexual abuse 
victims" as well as testimony that "an alleged victim 
exhibits behavior consistent with such a profile." State v. 
Charles L., 183 W.Va. 64i, 659,398 S.E.2d i23, i4i (W. 
Va. 1990). Accord State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 
(Minn. 1984). 
Other courts prohibit "consistent with" testimony. For 
example, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled: "Once 
the jury has learned the victim's behavior from the 
evidence and has heard experts explaining why sexual 
abuse may cause delayed reporting, inconsistency, or 
recantation, we do not believe the jury needs an expert to 
explain that the victim's behavior is consistent or incon-
sistent with the crime having occurred." State v. Moran, 
151 Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248,255 (1986). 
Still other courts reject the substantive use of expert 
testimony to prove the fact of abuse. In adopting this 
position, the Utah Supreme Court questioned the scien-
tific basis of this type of evidence. 
[T]he child abuse profile consists of a long list of vague 
and sometimes conflicting psychological characteris-
tics that are relied upon to establish the fact of injury in 
a specific case as well as the cause ... 
Not only is there lack of any consensus about the 
ability of the profile to determine abuse, but the scien-
tific literature raises serious doubts as to the reliability 
of profile testimony when used for forensic purposes to 
demonstrate abuse actually occurred. State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 401 (Utah 1989). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the same 
conclusion: "According to the literature on the subject, 
there is no one classical or typical personality profile for 
abused children. The difficulty with identifying a set of 
behaviors exhibited by abused children is that abused 
children react in a myriad of ways that ... may be the 
very same behaviors as children exhibit who are not 
abused." Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832 
(Pa. 1992) (CASAS evidence is not generally accepted by 
the scientific community). 
See also Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 
817 (Ky. 1986); State v. York, 564 A.2d 389, 391 (Me. 
1989) (no empirical research supports reliability of diag-
nosing sex abuse based on subsequent behavior); 
Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990); 
State v. Hudnall, 293 S.C. 97, 99-100, 359 S.E.2d 59, 
61-62 (1987). 
Explaining Behavior 
Virtually all courts admit evidence derived from 
research on child sexual abuse when offered in response 
to a defense suggestion that specific behavior is incon-
sistent with a claim of abuse. For example, courts have 
admitted expert testimony to explain why a sexually 
abused child: 
(1) would delay making an accusation, Wheat v. State, 
527 A.2d 269,273 (Del. 1987); State v. Myers, 359 
N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984); State v. Carlson, 360 
N.W.2d442, 442-43 (Minn. App. 1985); Smith v. 
State, 100 Nev. 570, 572-73, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev. 
1984); 
(2) retract an accusation, State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 
384, 728 P.2d 248, 254 (1986) (factors that lead a 
victim to recant and attemptto return home are 
admissible); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 
1085-86; 475 N.Y.S.2d 741,741-42 (Grim. Ct. 1984); 
Statev,'Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 437-38, 657 P.2d 
1215, 1220-21 (1983); 
(3) make inconsistent statements, Duckett v. State, 797 
S.W.2d 906, 915-17 (Tex. Grim. App. 1990) (numer-
ous inconsistencies and delayed reporting are 
elements ofCSAAS); 
(4) remain with the offender. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 
973, 978 fY'Jyo. 1988) (expert testified that ''it was 
common for adolescent victims to remain in the 
area of the offender"); or 
(5) appear calm after an incident, State v. Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d 240,252, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (1988) (expert 
testimony that it is common for sexual assault 
victims to be emotionally flat admitted when 
defense suggested such conduct was inconsistent 
with assault claim). 
Commentators have pointed out that such "expert 
testimonyJsneededJo disabuse jurors of commonly held 
misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain 
the emotional antececlents ofabused children's seeming-
ly self-impeaching behavior.'' Myers, supra, at 89. 
Expert testimony that would explain why a mother 
would refrain from reporting sex abuse of her child to the 
police is also admissible. People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 
1289, 1302,812 P.2d 563, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (1991). 
Credibility 
. Several courts have admitted expert testimony on 
credibility in this context. For example, the Montana 
Supreme Court has held that expert testimony is admis-
sible "for the purpose of helping the jury to assess the 
credibility of a child sexual as.sault victim." State v. 
Gayman, 224 Mont. 194, 200, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (1986). 
This rule includes testimony that a particular child is tell-
ingthe truth. See State v. Hall, 244 Mont. 161, 172-74, 797 
P.2d 183, 190-91 (1990); State v. French, 233 Mont. 364, 
36e. 76o P.2d 86, aa-89 (1988). 
Most courts, however, prohibit this type of expert 
testimony. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded: 
Thus, even where expert testimony on behavioral 
characteristics that affect credibility or accuracy of 
observation is allowed, experts should not be allowed 
to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or credi-
bility of a particular witness in the case being tried .... 
Opinion evidence on who is telling the truth in cases 
such as this is nothing more than the expert's opinion 
on how the case should be decided ... [S)uch testimo-
ny is inadmissible, both because it usurps the jury's 
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traditional functions and roles and because, when 
given insight into the behavioral sciences, the jury 
needs nothing further from the expert. State v. Lindsey, 
149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986). 
Accord Lickey v. State, 108 Nev. 191, 827 P.2d 824, 826 
(1992) (psychologist may not testify about veracity of a 
victim); Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 444, 517 
A.2d 920, 922 (1986) (pediatrician may not testify 
concerning credibility of alleged 8-year old victim). 
Federal Evidence Rule 608, which governs the 
impeachment use of character evidence, has sometimes 
played a role inJhe~case~.Rule 608(a) permits opinion 
and reputation evidence concerning the truthful charac-
ter of a witness after that witness has been impeached. 
In State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2dJ330 (1982), the 
Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that an expeit's 
testimony that he found the complaining witness "believ-
able" was admissible under Hawaii Rule 608(a), which is 
patterned after the federal rule: 
While [the expert's) opinion was not couched in terms 
of character, its function and effect were indistinguish-
able from traditional character evidence .... Essen-
tially, the difference between an opinion as to 
character for truthfulness and an opinion as to the 
believability of a witness' statements is the difference 
between 'I think X is believable' and 'X's statement is 
believable.' We feel the admissibility of either statement 
should turn not on niceties of phraseology but on the 
probative value of the testimony. /d. at 610 n. 14, 645 
P.2d at 1339 n. 14. 
Most courts, however, reject this view. The Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that the distinction rejected in 
Kim "represents an important policy choice" that 
prevents trials from being turned into contests between 
what would amount to modern oath-helpers who would 
largely usurp the fact-finding function of judge or jury." 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,392 (Utah 1989). The 
court went on to embrace the position of the majority of 
courts that have "rejected Kim" and bar such testimony 
under Rule 608./d. Accord United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 
336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 
595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1073 (1988). 
Indeed, the 1-Jawaii Supreme Court subsequently over-
ruled Kim. Statev. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 563, 799 P.2d 
48, 54 (1990) (l=xpert may not that testify child is "believa-
ble" and Kim is overruled). 
PROFILE OF ABUSERS 
A related issue involves expert testimony that focuses 
on the defendant rather than the child. Most courts 
exclude evidence of an abuser profile. For example, in 
United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988), 
the prosecution in rebuttal called an expert who testified · 
about the characteristics of a typical child molester. 
These include "an early disruption in the family environ-
ment, often with one parent missing; a relationship with 
the parent of the opposite sex who is dominant; unsuc-
cessful relationships with women; a poor self-concept; 
and general instability in the background." /d. at 480. The 
Ninth Circuit ruled this testimony inadmissible. The 
defendant had not offered any character evidence, and 
thus rebuttal on this score was impermissible. The court 
also commented that "testimony of criminal profiles is 
highly undesirable as substantive evidence because it is 
of low probativity and inherently prejudicial." /d. See also 
Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769, 
773 (1985); Myers, supra at 144 ("The relevant scientific 
literature does not support the conclusion that there is a 
reliable profile of a 'typical' sex offender"). 
In People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 1302-04, 812 
P.2d 563, 569-72, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389-90 (1991), the 
California Supreme Court upheld the admission of expert 
testimony concerning child abusers. The expert testified 
that there was no profile of a typical abuser. Then he 
proceeded to testify that a child molester can be from any 
social or financial status, race, age, occupation, 
geographic origin, or religious group. They can also be 
persons of impeccable reputations. The court held this 
testimony was helpful to the jury because it debunked 
common myths aboutabusers: that abusers are 
strangers, old, gay, alcoholic, or retarded .. 
Profiles Offered by Defense 
Most courts prohibit defense evidence offered to show 
that the accused does not fit the sex abuser profile. For 
example, the Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that a trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding such 
evidence on the grounds that it would not assist the jury. 
State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329,332 (Iowa 1992). 
Accord United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (sex offender profile not generally accepted in 
the scientific community); State v. Tucker, 165 Ariz. 340, 
346, 798 P.2d 1349, 1353-55 (App. 1990); State v. Puliz-
zano, 155 Wis. 2d 633; 657,456 N.W.2d 325, 355 (1990) 
(error for prosecutor to argue that the accused's history 
as a victim of child sexual abuse increased likelihood 
that she committed the alleged acts). 
In People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1152-53, 783P.2d 
698, 707-08, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 120-21 (1989), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court adopted a minority position. The 
court held that a defendant charged with child molesting 
may introduce expert character evidence establishing 
that he is not a deviant. See also People v. McAlpin, 53 
Cal. 3d 1289, 1304, 812 P.2d 563, 576-78, 283.Cal. Rptr. 
382, 391-95 (1991); People v. Ruiz, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1241. 
1243, 272 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370 (1990) (scientific community 
has not developed a standard pedophile profile). 
"ANATOMICALLY CORRECT" DOLLS 
A number of courts have considered expert testimony 
based on the use of "anatomically correct" dolls. In 
United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988), an 
expert (child therapist) testified that "the child's behavior 
with anatomically correct dolls showed she had been 
abused by a man using his penis and not by a woman." 
ld. at 480. The Ninth Circuit ruled that this use of the dolls 
failed to satisfy the Frye general acceptance test and was 
thus inadmissible. /d. at 481. Accord In re Amber B., 191 
Cal. App. 3d 682, 690-91,236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987). 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that the 
"empirical literature clearly reflects a concern that 
repeated use ofthe dolls can be highly suggestive." United 
States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1370 (8th 
Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 110S. Ct. 3267 (1990). 
Other courts disagree. In Reyna v. State, 797 S.W.2d 
189 (Tex. App. 1990), a Texas appellate court ruled that 
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the dolls were "not used as a scientific method of proof, 
but merely as a tool to aid the jury with the witness' 
testimony." /d. at 193. Accordingly, their use was permis-
sible. See also Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946, 955 (Col. 
1990) (dolls provide corroboration for admissibility of 
child hearsay statements); State v. Oslund, 469 N.W.2d 
489,494-95 (Minn. App. 1991). 
The commentators are also divided. Many believe that 
the "danger in the use of the dolls is that they will stimu-
late fantasy and not recall, and plant a falsified memory 
of fantasy to be recalled later as truth." Christiansen, 
'The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and 
the Influence of Pretrial Interviews," 62 Wash. L. Rev. 
705, 711 (1987). See also Levy, "Using 'Scientific' 
Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse," 23 Fam. L.Q. 
148 (1989) ("[T)estimony about anatomically correct dolls 
should be inadmissible"); Sagatun, "Expert Witnesses in 
Child Abuse Cases," 9 Behav. Sci. & L. 201, 210-12 
(Spring 1991) ("little scientific" literature on subject); J. 
Myers, Child Witness Law and Practice§ 4.17L (1992 
Supp.) (discussing literature on use of dolls). 
In contrast, others opine that "[r)ecent research indi-
cates that the dolls can be helpful in evaluating suspect-
ed abuse." Myers, supra at 63 n. 259. 
EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM 
Several cases discuss a defendant's right to an 
involuntary physical or psychological examination of 
alleged rape or child abuse victims. 
Physical Examinations 
The courts have adopted several approaches to the 
issue as applied to physical examinations. Comment, 
"A Fourth Amendment Approach to Compulsory Physical 
Examinations of Sex Offense Victims," 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
873 (1990). 
Some courts recognize a due process right to such an 
examination. "In these circumstances and limited to the 
facts of this case, we hold that appellant, as a matter of due 
process and fairness, was entitled at least to have the 
alleged victim examined by an independent gynecologist 
in preparation for trial." Turner v. Commonwealth, 767 
S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). 
Other courts allow the trial judge to order a physical 
examination of an alleged child abuse victim if the defen-
dant can demonstrate a compelling need. For example, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a trial court's 
inherent power to order a physical examination, but only 
when there is such a need: 
[C]ourts may order the physical examination of a child 
sex-abuse victim only when satisfied that the defen-
dant has made a sufficient showing that such an 
examination can produce competent evidence that has 
substantial probative worth, and if admitted and 
believed by the trier of fact, that evidence could refute 
or neutralize incriminating evidence or impugn the 
credibility of prosecution witnesses. Further, the court 
must be satisfied that the defendant's need clearly 
outweighs the possible harmful consequences to the 
alleged victim. State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 604 A.2d 
89, 95 (1992). 
Accord People v. Chard, 808 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Colo. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. .186 (1991). 
Still other courts refuse to recognize such a right under 
any conditions because the "order requiring compl~inant 
to submit to a physical examination was clearly outside 
the scope of discovery authorized by the statute [and 
thus]the judge had no authority to issue that order and it 
is void." E.g., State ex rei. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d 
141, 144-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 
Psychological Examinations 
A similar diversity of opinion exists concerning involun-
tary psychological or psychiatric examinations. See 
An not., "Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination 
to Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant 
in Sexual Offense Prosecutions," 45 A.L.R.4th 310 (1986). 
Sollie courts hold that trial courts lack the authority to 
oidersuch examinations. State v. Gabrielson, 464 
N.W.2d 434,436 (Iowa 1990). Others use a "substantial 
need" test. Virgin Islands v. Leonard A., 922 F.2d 1141, 
1143-44 (3d Cir. 1991); State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 21, 514 
A.2d 1287, 1291 (1986). 
Defendants have challenged a refusal to order an 
examination on constitutional grounds. The Ninth Circuit, 
however, has ruled that a trial court's refusal to order a 
psychiatric examination of two young sexual assault 
victims to determine whether they exhibited signs of 
Rape Trauma Syndrome did not violate due process. 
Gilpin'v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928,931 (9th Cir. 1990). 
A different issue may be presented, however, if the 
state uses an expert. The Nevada Supreme Court has 
held: "[U)nless competent evidence presents a compel-
ling reason to protect the victim, it is error to deny a 
defendant the assistance of a defense psychologist or 
J:ISychia:trist to examine the child-victim and testify at trial 
when Hie-State is provided such assistance." Lickey V. 
State, 827 P.2d 824, 826 (Nev. 1992). 
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